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The Rehnquist Court's First 
Term - Is Miranda Down For 
The Count? 
A. Introduction 
This article will examine how the Rehn-
quist Court in its first term has treated the 
Miranda decision. Based on the first four 
Miranda cases to come before it, it is 
apparent that the Rehnquist Court will 
continue to construe Miranda narrowly. 
The Rehnquist Court is thus continuing 
the work that was started by the Burger 
Court, which chipped away at various 
aspects of the Miranda decision over a fif-
teen year period. This article will begin 
with an analysis of the pre-Miranda 
"voluntariness" standard regarding confes-
sions gtven by suspects. Then Miranda's 
concrete guidelines will be analyzed. Next, 
the Burger Court's efforts in narrowing 
Miranda will be explored. Lastly, this arti-
cle will analyze the Rehnquist Court's 
treatment of Miranda during its first term. 
B. The Pre-Miranda ''Voluntariness'' 
Standard 
The Supreme Court's decision in Miran-
da v. Arizona changed the way the police 
interrogation process was carried out in 
this country. The use of improper police 
interrogation techniques to elicit confes-
sions from suspects had been a special con-
cern since the early 1930's, when the 
Wickersham Commission report on police 
abuses was released.! In the mid-thirties 
the Supreme Court specifically addressed 
the problem in BrO'Wn v. ltlississippi3, 
which involved a state homicide convic-
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tion based upon a confession obtained 
through physical punishment. Although 
there was no clear ground for reversing the 
conviction,· the Court found the whole 
interrogation procedure "revolting to the 
sense of justice,"5 and therefore violative 
of the fourteenth amendment's due pro-
cess clause. 
In the thirty years following Brown, the 
Court decided more than thirty cases con-
cerning allegedly coerced confessions.6 
During this period the "voluntariness" 
doctrine regarding coerced confessions 
emerged. At first the Court's primary con-
cern was with confessions coerced by 
physical brutality.7 The Court soon 
brought psychological coercion within the 
"voluntariness" doctrine as well.8 
Although the due process rationale initial-
ly was directed at the potential unreliabili-
ty of the evidence,9 the doctrine gradually 
expanded, focusing also on the fairness of 
the police interrogation practiceslO and the 
individual's state of mind in deciding 
whether or not to confess.I,1 
Gradually, the Court came to rely less 
upon whether the confession was reliable 
to decide its "voluntariness" and more 
upon whether, given the totality of the cir-
cumstances, the confession could be said to 
be voluntary}! In a series of decisions, the 
Court listed some factors that should be 
weighted in considering the totality of cir-
cumstances upon which "voluntariness" 
was to be predicated.13 Among these fac 
tors were: the age of the accused,14 the 
accused's education and intellegience,ls the 
conditions under which the interrogation 
took place,16 the physical and mental con-
dition of the accused,17 the inducements, 
methods, and strategies used to persuade 
the accused to confess,18 and the extent to 
which the police used deceit and trickery 
while questioning the suspect. 19 Thus, 
despite the apparent simplicity of the 
"voluntariness" concept on its face, as 
applied it proved to be highly elusive, 
requiring a careful balancing of complex 
variables concerning police behavior and 
the suspect's subjective attributes.!O 
Consistent with its general and flexible 
approach in defining "voluntariness," the 
Court's later decisions did not precisely 
articulate what factors rendered a confes-
sion involuntary and therefore violative of 
a suspect's due process rights.21 The 
Court's opinions condemned "overbear-
ing the will" of the accused as determined 
by the "totality of the circumstances."22 
The Court reasoned that "overbearing the 
will" was fundamentally unfair ana that 
"ours is an accusatorial and not an 
inquisitorial system."2J 
Given the Court's inability to articulate 
a clear definition of "voluntariness," state 
courts persistently took advantage of the 
loose concept and validated confessions of 
doubtful constitutionality, resulting in an 
increased burden on the Supreme Court in 
reviewing these cases.!· This increased bur-
den caused the Court to seek to create, 
"some automatic device by which the' 
potential evils of incommunicado int~r~ 
rogation could be controlled."25 Also,' 
legal commentators were highly critical of 
the "voluntariness" standard.26 The first 
criticism was that the standard left police 
without guidelines on how to' conduct 
interrogations of suspectsP As stated by 
Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer, "because 
of its vagueness and its insistence on assess-
ing the 'totality of circumstances', the 
voluntariness standard gave no guidance to 
police officers seeking to ascertain what 
questioning tactics they could use."28 
Police had to be watchful as to when the 
ad hoc point at which a suspect's will was 
overborne was reached.29 In other words, 
the standard's ambiguity did not inform 
police with specificity regarding available 
alternatives to be used in conducting custo-
dial interrogation.30 
The ambiguity of the "voluntariness" 
standard led to a second difficulty, the dif-
ficulty of judicial review.31 Commentators 
asserted that if the standard failed to give 
guidelines to police, then it could not 
afford the courts the necessary guidelines 
to decide whether or not a confession was 
voluntary.32 Consequently, this lack of 
guidance led to an ad hoc due process 
approach. Because judges "were virtually 
invited" to give weight to their subjective 
preferences when performing the elusive 
task of balancing" and weighing the totali-
ty of the circumstances,33 the disposition 
of cases greatly varied. 
Another substantial defect of the 
"voluntariness" standard asserted by com-
mentators was that its application was 
"fatally dependent upon resolution of the 
swearing contest."34 Since no one other 
than the accused and the police is present 
during custodial interrogation, judges had 
to decide on the relative credibility of the 
testimony of each, with the police 
invariably receiving more credibility.35 
C. Miranda's Concrete Gl,1idelines 
The Court's first major step in seeking 
some clear-cut guidelines by which to con-
trol the evils of incommunicado interroga-
tion rested on the sixth amendment 
guarantee of the right to counsel in 
criminal cases. Prior to 1964, the refusal of 
police to permit the subject of interroga-
tion to consult with counsel was regarded 
as only one of the factors relevant to the 
"voluntariness" of the confession.36 In 
Massiah 'V. United States,37 however, the 
Court held that a post-indictment inter-
rogation was a "critical stage" of the prose-
cution to which the right to counsel 
attaches. The sixth amendment, therefore, 
required the exclusion of incriminating 
statements, made by the, accused after he 
had been indicted and in the absence of 
counse1.38 Massiah, however, was limited 
to post-indictment confessions, and unfor-
tunately this did not affect the majority. of 
improper police interrogations. 
A month later, in Escobedo 'V. Illinois,39 
the Court extended its sixth amendment 
approach to pre-indictment interrogation. 
Yet, the precise reach of this decision was 
left uncertain due to the Court's sweeping 
language and its express limitation of the 
holding to the specific facts in Escobedo. 
This ambiguity generated considerable 
debate and confusion.40 
Two years after Escobedo, the Court 
shifted its emphasis from the sixth amend-
ment to the fifth, and granted certiorari in 
Miranda "to explore some facets of the 
problems ... of applying the privilege 
against self-incrimination to in-custody 
interrogation, and to give concrete con-
situtional guidelines for law enforcement 





interrogations. " . . 
Miranda was a series of four companion 
cases involving the same situation: In each, 
the defendant had been arrested and not 
informed of his constitutional rights. The 
accused in each case was then taken to the 
police station where confessions were 
elicited and later used to convict the 
defendant at trial.42 In each case the Court 
held that the improperly elicited 
confession violated each defendant's fifth 
amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. The first issue confronting 
the Court concerned the applicability of 
the privilege in the extrajudicial context of 
police interrogation. Although the Court 
had so applied the privilege against self-
incrimination seventy years earlier in 
Bram 'V. United States, 43 that decision had 
been vigorously criticized as founded upon 
a confusion between the constitutional 
privilege and the common law rule 
governing coerced confessions.44 The 
Miranda Court reaffirmed Bram.45 
The Court next turned its attention to 
the nature of custodial interrogation. At 
the outset, the Court noted that, in part 
because of the traditionally incom-
municado setting of police interrogation, 
the use of physical brutality to secure con-
fessions could not effectively be eradicated 
without additional limitations on the 
police interrogation process.46 The Court 
then observed that the modern practice of 
in-custody interrogation is primarily 
psychological rather than physical. After 
describing various psychological tactics 
advocated in police manuals as effective 
means of obtaining confessions, the Court 
stressed that it had long recognized that 
coercion can and does exist even in the 
absence of physical brutalityY Thus, the 
Court maintained that "even without 
employing brutality, the 'third degree' or 
the specific strategems described above, 
the very fact of custodial interrogation 
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty 
and trades on the weakness of indivi-
duals."48 Although conceding that the con-
fessions of the four defendants involved in 
Miranda might not "have been involun-
tary in traditional terms," the Court con-
cluded that to offset the coercive pressures 
inherent in custodial interrogation, safe-
guards must be employed to assure that the 
suspects has a "full opportunity to exercise 
the privilege against self-incrimination."49 
Accordingly, Miranda established con-
crete guidelines for custodial interroga-
tions in an attempt to guarantee suspects 
their fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination. Recognizing that the Con-
stitution does not require any particular 
solution to the problem, the Court 
declared that unless "other procedures 
which are at least as effective in apprising 
accused persons of their right of silence 
and in assuring a continuous opportunity 
to exercise it" are employed,50 prior to any 
questioning, the person must be advised of 
his Miranda rights which include: the right 
to remain silent, any statement made may 
be used as evidence against him, and the 
right to counsel, either retained or 
appointed. Finally, the Court stated that 
the defendant may waive these rights pro-
vided that the waiver is made voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently, however, if 
the defendant indicates in any manner at 
any stage of the process that he wishes to 
consult with an attorney or not to be ques-
tioned, the interrogation must cease.51 
It is evident from the language of the 
Miranda opinion that the Court believed 
that the new procedures were protected by 
the Constitution.52 The Jliranda Court 
stessed: 
We encouraged Congress and the 
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states continue their laudable search 
for increasingly effective ways of pro-
tecting the rights of the individual 
while prompting efficient enforcement 
of our criminal laws. However, unless 
we are shown other procedures which 
are at least as effective in appraising 
accused persons of their right of silence 
and in assuring a continuing oppor-
tunity to exercise it, the following safe-
guards must be observed.53 
A plain reading of this passage indicates 
that the procedures mandated by the 
Court in Miranda are constitutionally pro-
tected and shall be the law unless and until 
Congress or the states devise procedures 
that are at least as effective as those set for-
th in MirandaY 
D. The Burger Court Slices into Miran-
da 
The Miranda decision was criticized by 
many after it was handed down. Senator 
Sam J. Ervin, Jr. lambasted the Miranda 
holding, claiming that it left the police 
powerless to conduct in-custody interroga-
tion of suspects.55 Judge Henry Friendly of 
the Second Circuit expressed concern that 
the Court's Miranda holding would undu-
ly hamper proper police interrogation 
practices.56 The FBI was concerned that 
Miranda would hinder its efforts to obtain 
confessions from suspects.57 Nevertheless, 
the Miranda decision was a legacy of the 
Warren Court that was inherited by the 
Burger Court. 
In the early seventies it appeared that the 
Court was paving the way to overrule 
Miranda. The Burger Court's first con-
frontation with Miranda, Harris v. New 
York,58 presented the question whether 
statements elicited from a defendant 
without full compliance with the Miranda 
safeguards could be used to impeach the 
defendant when he testified at trial. The 
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Burger, answered this question in the affir-
mative. Although Miranda had indicated 
that statements obtained in violation of its 
dictates could not be used to impeach the 
defendant,59 the Chief Justice's Harris 
opinion maintained that Miranda's discus-
sion of the impeachment issue "was not at 
all necessary to the Court's holding and 
cannot be regarded as controlling."60 The 
Harris decision, in essence, gave Miranda a 
technical reading, thus enabling Burger's 
opinion to label many critical aspects of 
the Miranda decision mere dictum and 
therefore not "controlling." 
Then, in Michigan v. Tucker,61 the Court, 
in an opinion by then associate Justice 
Rehnquist, held that the prosecution could 
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use evidence which was the "fruit" of an 
unwarned statement. In the case the defen-
dant was arrested for rape and assault and 
taken to the police station for questioning. 
The defendant was not advised of his right 
to appointed counsel prior to interroga-
tion and proceeded to give incriminating 
information to the police. At trial, the 
defendant objected to the prosecution's 
use of the incriminating statements on the 
ground that the police obtained the state-
ments only through an unlawful interroga-
tion. The state courts affirmed the 
defendant's conviction,62 but a federal dis-
trict court granted habeas corpus relief 
that was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.63 The Supreme Court 
reversed. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion reasoned that the procedur-
al safeguards set out in Miranda "were not 
themselves rights protected by the Consti-
tution."M Justice Rehnquist then conclud-
ed that there had been no violation of 
Tucker's rights under the fifth amendment 
"In the early 
seventies it appeared 
that the Court was 
paving the way to 
overrule Miranda." 
because his statement "could harldy be 
termed involuntary as that term has been 
defined in the decisions of this Court."65 
The majority's conclusion in Tucker, 
that there is a violation of the self-
incrimination clause only if a confession is 
involuntary under traditional standards, 
was an outright rejection of the core 
premises of Miranda. As Justice Rehnquist 
added, the Court in Miranda thought that 
the privilege against self-incrimination 
offered a "more comprehensive and less 
subjective protection"66 than the due 
process clause, which had been the basis of 
the traditional "voluntariness" test. Thus, 
recognizing the inherently compelling 
nature of in-custody interrogation,67 the 
Miranda Court had held that in the 
absence of appropriate safeguards, an 
improperly elicited statement violated the 
accused's fifth amendment rights despite 
its voluntary character under traditional 
standards. Justice Rehnquist's analysis in 
Tucker· viewing the privilege solely in 
terms of the voluntariness test-simply 
rejected this aspect of Miranda. The con-
clusion that a violation of Miranda is not 
a violation of the right against self-
incrimination is flatly inconsistent with 
the Court's declaration in Miranda that 
"the requirement of warnings and waiver 
or rights is a fundamental with respect to 
the fifth amendment privilege."68 
Having concluded that the conduct of 
the police did not violate the defendant's 
rights in Tucker under the fifth amend-
ment, Justice Rehnquist next turned to the 
question of whether the incriminating 
statements should have been excluded 
because they were fruits of a statement 
elicited in violation of the Miranda safe-
guards. In Wong Sun v. United States, 69 the 
Court held that the fruits of an unconstitu-
tional search and seizure must be suppress-
ed. Justice Rehnquist distinquished Wong 
Sun, in that the police conduct in Tucker, 
unlike in Wong Sun, did not violate the 
defendant's constitutional rights.7° The 
implications of the earlier analysis now 
became apparent. Although Miranda was 
not overruled by Tucker, it thereafter 
stood below even the disfavored fourth 
amendment exclusionary rule in constitu-
tional importance. 
The Tucker decision proved devastating 
for Miranda. The Court deprived Miranda 
of a constitutional basis and further failed 
to explain what other basis there might be 
for Miranda. Moreover, even if Tucker did 
not entirely dismantle Miranda, it clearly 
severed it from the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination. The decision in 
Tucker seemed to have laid the ground-
work to overrule Miranda. 71 
In Oregon v. Hass,72 the Court further 
defined its earlier Harris ruling. In Hass, 
the defendant was arrested for theft and 
given his Miranda warnings. Nevertheless, 
the defendant admitted stealing two 
bicycles, but was uncertain as to the 
bicycles' whereabouts. The defendant and 
a police officer then departed in a patrol 
car to look for the bicycles. On the way, 
the defendant changed his mind and asked 
to telephone his attorney. The officer told 
the defendant he could contact his 
attorney when they returned to the station 
but, instead of returning immediately, the 
officer continued the investigation.73 The 
officer's conduct at this point amounted to 
a "bad faith" violation of Miranda, as com-
pared to the police conduct in Harris, 
which was not taken in "bad faith." The 
defendant eventually located the stolen 
bicycles and told the officer from which 
house they had been stolen. The defendant 
was convicted at trial. The Oregon appel-
late courts overturned the conviction, 
holding that the evidence obtained by the 
police after the defendant had requested an 
attorney was inadmissible even for pur-
posed of impeachment.74 The Supreme 
Court reversed. 
The result of Hass was that even when 
the police act in bad faith in violating a 
defendant's Miranda rights, any evidence 
obtained subsequent to the violation can 
be used to impe;lch a defendant who testi-
fies at trial. In practical effect, Hass consti-
tuted an open invitation to police to 
disregard a suspect's right to the assistance 
of counsel. Justice Brennan, in his Hass dis-
sent, recognized this problem and stated: 
"Thus, after today's decisiop, if an indivi-
dual states that he wants an attorney, 
police interrogation will doubtless now be 
vigorously pressed to obtain statements 
before the attorney arrives."75 
E. The Rehnquist Court's First Term 
and Miranda 
By the time William Rehnquist was 
appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court in the summer of 1986, Miranda had 
already been substantially eroded away,16 
Moreover, the United States Attorney 
General, Edwin Meese III, had repeatedly 
called for Miranda's reversal since assum-
ing his position in 1985,17 Given this 
atmosphere, one could not expect the 
Rehnquist Court in its first term to look 
kindly toward Miranda. 
The Rehnquist Court first encountered 
Miranda in Colorado v. Connelly,18 In that 
case, the accused approached a Denver 
police officer and stated that he had mur-
dered someone and wanted to talk about 
it. The accused was given his Miranda 
rights by the officer, but acknowledged 
that he understood them and nevertheless 
wanted to talk about the murder. Shortly 
thereafter, a detective arrived and again 
advised the accused of his Miranda rights. 
Later at police headquarters the accused 
told his story to the police and pinpointed 
the exact location of the murder. The 
accused was held overnight. The next day, 
during an interview, the accused appeared 
disoriented and was sent to a state hospital 
for evaluation. It was discovered that the 
accused believed he was following the 
"voice of God" in confessing to the mur-
der. The trial court, relying on psychiatric 
testimony to the effect that the accused 
suffered from a psychosis that interfered 
with his ability to make free and rational 
choices, suppressed his initial statements 
and custodial confession because they were 
"involuntary." The Colorado Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding that respondent's 
mental condition precluded him from 
making a valid waiver of his Miranda 
rights.79 The Supreme Court reversed. 
The Court's OpIniOn by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist held that coercive police activi-
ty is a necessary predicate to a finding that 
a confession is not "voluntary" within the 
meaning of the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment.8o Because the 
police did nothing to "coerce" the accused 
into talking, the taking of the statements 
and their admission into evidence consti-
tuted no due process clause violation. The 
Court conceded that the mental condition 
of criminal defendants has become a more 
significant factor in the "voluntariness" 
calculus, Spano v. New York,81 but con-
cluded that this fact does not justify a con-
clusion that a defendant's mental 
condition, by itself and apart from its rela-
tion to official coercion, should even dis-





in Colorado v. 
Connelly. " 
The Rehnquist opinion then focused on 
the issue of whether the accused had waiv-
ed his Miranda rights. The Colorado 
Supreme Court held that no valid waiver 
occurred because the accused's mental con-
dition precluded him from making a free 
choice regarding the waiver. The Supreme 
Court disagreed. The Court held that 
"voluntariness" for Miranda waiver pur-
poses merely requires that there be an 
absence of police coercion before and dur-
ing the time a suspect gives a statement.83 
To support his proposition the Court 
relied on its 1985 decision in Oregon v. 
Elstad, 84 which suggested that any confes-
sion, whether or not it is preceded by 
Miranda advisements, is voluntary under 
the fifth amendment unless the police do 
some overt, coercive act. 
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented 
in Connelly. They criticized the Court's 
failure to recognize all forms of involun-
tariness or coercion as antithetical to due 
process.85 Moreover, the dissent relied on 
Culombe v. ConnecticutB6 which defined 
involuntary corifessions as those obtained 
compulsion, of whatever nature or howev-
er infused.87 It was also pointed out that in 
every prior case the Supreme Court had 
made clear that ensuring a confession was 
a product of a free will was an independent 
concern.88 Thus, the dissent refuted the 
majority's contention that police over-
reaching was the sole concern of the 
Court's prior "free will" confession cases. 
The Rehnquist Court next considered 
the Miranda issue in Connecticut v. Bar-
rett_ 89 In that case William Barrett was 
arrested for sexual assault. Barrett received 
the Miranda advisements three times. Each 
time he told he would not sign any written 
statement without counsel present, but he 
had no problem with "talking about the 
incident_"90 He then confessed to the 
assault. When the police tape recorder 
repeatedly failed to record the statement, 
one officer reduced his recollection of the 
statement to writing.91 
The trial court refused to suppress the 
confession, finding that the accused had 
fully understood the Miranda advisements 
and had voluntarily waived them. The 
Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction. The court held that the accus-
ed's expressed desire for counsel before 
making a written statement constitued an 
invocation of the right to counsel for all 
purposes. The Connecticut high court 
held that the accused had not waived his 
rights by initiating further discussion with 
the police, and therefore the incriminating 
statement was improperly admitted into 
evidence.92 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, reversed the Con-
necticut Supreme Court. The Chief Justice 
first analyzed the Connecticut Supreme 
Court's rationale in reversing the trial 
court. The Connecticut Supreme Court 
decided that Barrett's express desire for 
counsel before making a written statement 
served as an invocation of the right for all 
purposes.93 This invocation, the court 
believed, brought the case within what it 
called the "bright-line" rule for establish-
ing a waiver of this right.94 The "bright-
line" rule requires a finding that the 
suspect (a) initiate further discussions with 
the police, and (b) knowingly and intelli-
gently waive the right previously in-
voked.95 Because Barrett had not initiated 
further discussions with the police, Con-
necticut's highest court found his state-
ment improperly admitted into evidence. 
The majority's opinion stressed that Bar-
rett's willingness to talk about the crime 
that he allegedly committed constituted a 
voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. 
The Court explained that the fundamental 
purpose of Miranda advisements is to 
assure that an individual's right to choose 
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between speech and silence remains unfet-
tered throughout the interrogation pro-
cess.96 Barrett chose to speak rather than 
remain silent. Hence, according to the 
majority, his fifth amendment right 
against self incnmmation was not 
violatedY Moreover, the Court again 
made clear, as it had done in the past,98 
that the Miranda advisements are mere 
prophylactic rules rather than rules of con-
stitutional interpretation.99 
Justice Brennan concurred separately in 
Barrett. Brennan stressed Barrett's affir-
mative waiver of Miranda under the cir-
cumstances. Justice Brennan noted that 
Barrett orally expressed a willingness to 
talk with the police and signed a form 
indicating that he understood his rights. 100 
Barrett's actions thus enabled the state to 
meet its heavy burden of demonstrating a 
Miranda waiver}OI 
Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opin-
ion in which Justice Stevens joined. The 
basis of the opinion was that Barrett's writ 
of certiorari was improvidently granted. 
Justice Marshall categorized the case as one 
in which a state supreme court arguably 
granted more protection to a citizen accus-
ed of a crime than the federal Constitution 
required}02 According to Marshall, this 
was not a sufficient basis for the Court to 
grant certiorari, absent a conflict among 
the state or federal courts regarding the 
question presented}OJ The dissenting opin-
ion did not discuss the issue of the suffi-
ciency of Barrett's waiver of counsel. 
The Court decided Colorado v. Springl04 
on the same day that Barrett was decided. 
The Spring case also dealt with the validity 
of a suspects waiver of Miranda rights. In 
that case, the respondent Spring was 
arrested for his possible involvement in 
the interstate transportation of stolen fire-
arms. Respondent was advised of his 
Miranda rights. He signed a statement say-
ing he understood and waived his rights, 
and was willing to answer questions during 
interrogation. Spring was questioned 
about the firearms transactions that led to 
his arrest and was also asked whether he 
had ever shot anyone, to which he 
answered that he had "shot another guy 
once."105 About a month later Spring was 
given new Miranda advisements, but again 
signed a statement admitting that he 
understood his rights and was willing to 
waive them. He then confessed that he 
shot and killed a man in Colorado three 
months earlier and signed a statement to 
that effect}06 
After being charged in a Colorado state 
court with first-degree murder, Spring 
moved to suppress both the March 30 and 
May 26 statements on the ground that his 
Miranda waiver was invalid. The trial 
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court held that the questioners' failure to 
inform Spring before the March 30 inter-
view that they would question him about 
the Colorado murder did not affect the 
waiver and therefore, the March 30 state-
ment should not be suppressed. However, 
while ruling that the March 30 statement 
was inadmissibile on other grounds, the 
court held that the May 26 statement was 
made freely, voluntarily, and intelligently 
and should not be suppressed. Conse-
quently, it was admitted into evidence, 
resulting in Spring's conviction}07 The 
Colorado Supreme Court held that 
Spring's confession should have been sup-
pressed becaused it was the illegal "fruit" 
of the March 30 statement}08 
The Supreme Court reversed the deci-
sion of the Colorado Supreme Court. 
Justice Powell, writing the majority opin 
CCThe fourth and 
most recent Miranda 
case to come before 
the Rehnquist Court 
was Arizona v. 
Mauro." 
ion, first observed that Spring's May 26 
confession could not have been the "fruit 
of the poisonous tree" unless the previous 
March 30 statement was itself 
"poisonous." 109 The Court asserted that a 
suspect may waive his fifth amendment 
privilege provided the waiver is made vol-
untarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 110 
Consequently, based on the fact that 
Spring indicated that he understood the 
enumerated rights and signed a form 
expressing his intention to waive them, the 
Court concluded that Spring had voluntar-
ily waived his rights}11 
The Court relied on its prior decision in 
Moran v. Burbinel12 to advance the propo-
sition that the inquiry whether a waiver is 
coerced is a two-step process: first, the 
relinquishment of the right must have 
been the product of a free and deliberate 
uncoerced choice; and second, the waiver 
must have been made with a full awareness 
both of the nature of the right abandoned 
and the consequences of the decision to 
abandon it.IIJ The Court applied this test 
to Spring's waiver and concluded that it 
was voluntary. First, the Court stated that 
Spring alleged no coercion due to physical 
violence or other deliberate means 
calculated to break his will}14 Secondly, 
the Court held that the Constitution does 
not require that a suspect know and 
understand every possible consequence of 
a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege. 
To support this latter proposition, the 
majority relied on two of the Court's 
recent decisions, Moran 'V. Burbinel15 and 
Oregon v. EIstad. 116 
The majority then dismissed Spring's 
argument that the failure to inform him of 
the potential subject matter of interroga-
tion constituted police trickery and decep-
tion 'condemned in Miranda, thus 
rendering his waiver of Miranda rights 
invalid. The majority stated that "this 
Court has never held that mere silence by 
law enforcement officials as to the subject 
matter of an interrogation is 'trickery' suf-
ficient to invalidate a suspect's waiver of 
Miranda rights, and we expressly decline to 
so hold today."117 The Court again relied 
on Burbine for support, nothing that "we 
have held that a valid waiver does not 
require that an individual be informed of 
all information 'useful' in making his deci-
. "118 SlOn •••• 
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented 
in Spring. The dissenters agreed with the 
majority's conclusion that a waiver of 
Miranda's protections during custodial 
interrogation must be examined in light of 
the "totality ofthe circumstances." I 19 The 
dissenters then parted company with the 
majority and argued that a suspect's deci-
sion to waive Miranda could be influenced 
by his understanding of the scope and 
seriousness of the matters under investiga-
tion.I2O 
The dissenters disagreed with the majori· 
ty conclusion that a suspect's awareness of 
the subject matter of police questioning 
could only affect the wisdom, and not the 
validity, of a Miranda waiver. They stress-
ed that wisdom and validity in the Miranda 
waiver context are overlapping concepts, 
as circumstances relevant to assessing the 
validity of a waiver may also be highly 
relevant to its wisdom in any given con-
textYI 
The fourth and most recent Miranda case 
to come before the Rehnquist Court was 
Arizona v. Mauro. 122 In Mauro the respon-
dent was arrested for murder and subse-
quently given his Miranda advisements. 
He was then taken to the police station 
and again advised his Miranda rights. 
Mauro then told the officers that he did 
not wish to speak without having a lawyer 
present. Mauro's wife then asked, unk-
nown to Mauro, if she could speak to her 
husband. Her request was granted on the 
condition that a police officer remain in 
the room and record the conversation.123 
During the conversation, Mauro told his 
wife not to answer questions until a lawyer 
was present. 
At trial, Mauro's defense was that he had 
been insane at the time of the crime. The 
prosecution then played the tape of the 
meeting between Mauro and his wife, 
arguing that it demonstrated Mauro was 
not insane the day of the murder. The trial 
court refusd to suppress the recording, dis-
missing Mauro's argument that it was a 
product of police interrogation in viola-
tion of Miranda. 124 The Arizona Supreme 
Court reversed. It held that because Mauro 
spoke to this wife in the presence of a 
police officer, he was under interrogation 
within the meaning of Miranda. The court 
said this interrogation was impermissible 
because Mauro previously had invoked his 
right to counsel before questioning began. 
The Supreme Court reversed, with 
Justice Powell writing the majority opin-
ion. The opinion began by clarifying what 
constitutes police interrogation for Miran-
da purposes. The Court cited Rhode Island 
'0. Innis l25 for the proposition that itUran-
da's safeguards could be effectuated if they 
extended not only to express questioning, 
but also to its "functional equivalent."126 
Functional equivalent was defined as any 
action that the police should know would 
likely elicit an incriminating response 
from the suspect. 
The Court then focused on the case 
before it. It noted that Mauro did not want 
to be questioned without a lawyer present. 
Thus, the narrow issue was whether the 
officers' actions were the "functional 
equivalent" of police interrogation. The 
Court held that under both Miranda and 
Innis Mauro was not interrogated. 127 The 
basis for the holding was that there was no 
evidence that the officers sent Mrs. Mauro 
into see her husband for the purpose of 
eliciting incriminating statements. The 
Court acknowledged that there was the 
possibility that Mauro would incriminate 
himself while talking to his wife, but held 
that an interrogation does not take place 
under Innis when the police merely hope 
that a suspect will imcriminate himself.128 
It was pointed out that Mauro was not sub-
ject to compelling influences, psychologi-
cal ploys, or direct questioning. As a 
result, the majority concluded that his 
volunteered statements could not properly 
have been considered the result of police 
interrogation.129 
Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall 
joined in a dissenting opinion. They noted 
that the Arizona Supreme Court had 
unanimously and unequivocally concluded 
that the police intended to interrogate 
Mauro. Relying on the record, the dissent-
ers argued that the police employed a pow-
erful psychological ploy by failing to do 
three things: 1) warn Mauro that his wife 
was coming to talk to him; 2) tell Mauro 
that a police officer would accompany his 
wife into the interrogation room; and 3) 
tell Mauro that the conversation would be 
recorded. 130 It was also pointed out, as the 
transcript from the conversation revealed, 
that Mauro would not have freely chosen 
to speak with his wife had he known she 
was coming to talk to him. The dissenters 
concluded that the police interrogated 
Mauro because they allowed the conversa-
tion with his wife to commence at a time 
when they knew it was reasonably likely 
to produce an incriminating statement.1JI 
Consequently, because Mauro had invok-
ed his right to counsel, the subsequent 
interrogation violated his constitutional 
"Miranda will 
continue to be 
construed as 
narrowly as possible 
by the Rehnquist 
Court" 
rights, according to the dissent. 
F. Conclusion 
A careful reading of the first four Miran· 
da cases to come before the Supreme 
Court in its 1986/87 term suggests that 
Miranda will continue to be construed as 
narrowly as possible by the Rehnquist 
Court. The Court's decision in Connelly 
reaffirmed Oregon '0. Elstad132 regarding 
the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver. 
Both Connelly and Elstad stand for the 
proposition that a Miranda waiver will be 
considered voluntary unless the police use 
coercive tactics to induce it. In essence the 
holdings of Elstad and Connelly have resur-
rected the pre-Miranda voluntariness 
standard for determining whether a confes-
sion is voluntary. The pre-Miranda stand-
ard focused on the "totality of 
circumstances" surrounding a suspect's 
confession in order to determine whether 
it was given voluntarily.133 A fair 
reading of Elstad and Connelly leads to the 
conclusion that when a suspect confesses 
to a crime, even without having been given 
Miranda advisements, the confession will 
be deemed voluntary and not a violation 
of the fifth amendment's self-
incrimination clause unless the police used 
coercive tactics to elicit it. 
Moreover, the Court's decision in Con-
necticut v. Barrett l34 viewed the Miranda 
advisements as mere prophylactic rules, 
despite express language in Miranda to the 
effect that they are themselves constitu-
tional rights under the fifth amendment.135 
As a result, it is now possible for the police 
to violate a suspect's Miranda rights 
without at the same time violating his or 
her fifth amendment rights. 
Further, the Court's decision in Spring 
focused on the factors necessary to effect a 
valid Miranda waiver. As in Connelly, the 
linchpin of the Court's analysis was the 
proposition that a Miranda waiver is vol-
untary unless the police use coercive tac-
tics to induce it. Here again the Court's 
decision seems to advocate the use of the 
pre-Miranda "voluntariness" standard to 
determine whether a suspect's statement 
was given voluntarily. 
The Mauro decision, while not dealing 
with the Miranda waiver issue, also con-
tained language to the effect that a Miranda 
waiver is voluntary unless the police use 
coercive tactics to obtain it. The Court's 
decision cited Spring for the proposition 
that Miranda's safeguards are mere proce-
dural devices effective to secure the privi-
lege against self-incrimination and are not 
constitutional rights themselves. 
A strong argument can be made that for 
all intents and purposes the Miranda deci-
sion has been overruled. The Court's 
recent Miranda opinions lend strong sup-
port to this argument. It is clear that the 
Rehnquist Court views Miranda's guide-
lines as mere procedural devices rather 
than constitutional rights. Consequently, 
it is possible to violate a person's Miranda 
rights without at the same time violating 
his or her fifth amendment rights. In 
effect, Miranda has been transformed from 
a rule of constitutional interpretation to a 
rule of evidence. Only police coercion that 
elicits an incriminating response will now 
violate one's Miranda rights. Thus, in the 
future it may be easier for prosecutors to 
convict a suspect using his or her own 
statement(s). The new standard suggest a 
suspect using his or her own statement(s). 
The new standard suggests that anything a 
suspect says can be used against him or her 
as long as the police did not use coercive 
tactics to elicit the statement, irrespective 
of whether other forms of mental coercion 
were present. The result of this standard 
Fall, 1987/fhe Law Forum-13 
may be an increase in the use of incom-
municado interrogation by the police in 
the future; with the issues on appeal focus-
ing on the coerciveness of the police con-
duct rather than on the potential Miranda 
violations. 
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